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DEATH BE NOT PROUD: A NOTE ON
JUVENILE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
"Texan Put to Death for a Murder Committed at 17"'
"South Carolina Executes Killer, Age Stirs Protest-Pleas for Man Convicted at 17 are rejected"'
"Texas Man Executed By Lethal Injection in Deaths of
Women"3
Mention the death penalty and arguments abound.
Proponents claim the threat of death deters severe criminal
behavior. Opponents claim that society should not advocate
an "eye-for-an-eye"4 approach to sentencing. This paper
discusses not the death penalty itself but its application to a
specific class of persons: juveniles5 who kill.
Juvenile capital punishment has become one of the major
controversial issues to unfold in the last decade. This issue
adds a new dimension to the emotional debates surrounding
the death penalty. While it seems likely that death sentences
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at A19, col. 1.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at A6, col. 1.

2.

3. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1986, at B18, col. 3.
4. This is known as the talion principle. This principle is rooted in the Old Testament's
requirement of "burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe." Exodus 21:25. This
principle is also found in the Code of Hammurabi where it was written: "If a man destroy the
eye of another man, they shall destroy his eye"; and "if a man knock out a tooth of a man
of his own rank, they shall knock out his tooth." See Schoenfeld, The Desire to Abolish Capital
Punishment: A Psychoanalytically Oriented Analysis, 1983 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 168 (quoting
2 R.F. HARPER, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON ABOUT 2250 B.C. (1904)).
5. The age of eighteen represents a common viewpoint, or general legal consensus, as to
when the age of majority has been achieved. See Generally United States v. EK., 471 F. Supp.
924 (D. Or. 1979).
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will continue to be rendered," the question becomes to what
extreme will society go to allow the imposition of such a
penalty. In other words, does the death penalty become cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment
to the United States Constitution7 when a juvenile offender is
involved?'

Two recent Supreme Court decisions have answered
this question. In 1988, the Court set an historical precedent
by holding that juveniles under sixteen years of age cannot be
executed." A year later, however, the Court firmly applied the
constitutional brakes and refused to increase the age limit to
include all juveniles under eighteen years of age." Thus, there

exists today a judicial gap in which juveniles between the ages
of sixteen and eighteen can be sentenced to death.
As this paper will argue, modern principles of law dictate
that no persons should be sentenced to death unless they are
at least eighteen years of age." The Court's creation of a gap
6. The fact that thirty-five states have death penalty statutes is reflective of a legislative
trend in favor of such a punishment. See Amicus Brief of the American Bar Association for
the Petitioner at 11, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169).
7. The eighth amendment states that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
(emphasis added).
8. All age delineations mentioned or proposed in this paper apply to the offender at the
time of the crime.
9. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2711 (1988) (plurality opinion).
10. Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
11. While this paper expresses the view that eighteen is the age at which a bright line
should be drawn for capital punishment, it is recognized that nothing magical happens at this
age in terms' of an adolescent becoming an adult; rather, this age represents a consensus
viewpoint generally utilized in the law as to when the age of majority arrives. See generally
United States v. EK., 471 F. Supp. 924 (D.. Ore. 1979):
Psychologists, psychiatrists, youth counselors and all parents recognize
how arbitrary such a distinction based on age [is]. . . . Few of us
over the age of 18 can recall gaining any significantly greater measure of
wisdom, insight or skill on the day after our 18th birthday which we did
not already possess in the very days before that birthday.
Id. at 932.
Also, this paper will not proffer arguments for alternate punishments in lieu of death.
tlowever, the author believes that juvenile murderers should be given life sentences with the
possibility of eventual parole based on successful rehabilitation. This argument is grounded
in the belief that the penal system should be responsible for ensuring that juvenile killers
partake in rehabilitative programs. While in prison, these juveniles should be provided with
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between ages sixteen and eighteen falls short of contemporary
standards of decency which mark a progressing society."2 By
creating such a gap, the Court has failed to acknowledge that
all "children have a special place in life which the law should
reflect."'3

HI.

BACKGROUND OF THE DEAni

PENALTY

Prior to 1972, the constitutionality of the death penalty
had never been seriously challenged." Beginning with the
Court's decision in Furman v. Geoigia,5 the death penalty
underwent a constitutional facelift in an attempt to bring it in
line with the modern era. Contrary to popular belief, the
Court in Furman did not completely ban the use of the death
penalty as a legitimate form of punishment. Rather, what the
Court decided in Furman was that the manner in which the
death penalty was being imposed was unconstitutional because
it allowed the sentencing authority unchecked discretion to
impose the penalty.' Although the decision, which included
nine separate opinions, left unanswered the question of the
specific constitutional requirements for sentencing in capital
cases, the concurring opinions agreed that such a severe and
irreversible punishment should not be imposed under
sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that
infliction would be arbitrary and unpredictable. 7
As a result of Furman, the capital punishment statutes
of many states were revised. 8 These revisions were placed
therapeutic services which promote social and moral development. Otherwise, without the
possibility of parole, a life sentence would be tantamount to execution.
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (2d Cir. 1958).
13. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
14. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 407-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15. Id at 238 (per curiam). Concurring in the opinion were Justices Stewart, White,
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall.
16. Id at 238.
17. Id.
18. See England, Capital Punishment inthe light
of Constitutional Evolution: An Analysis
of Distinction Between Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 596, 598 (1977).
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under judicial scrutiny in 1976 when the Court decided a
series of cases which in effect launched the current era of
capital punishment jurisprudence. In Gregg v. Georgia,9 the
Court held that the penalty of death does not violate the
eighth amendment.'
As one commentator notes, "[t]he
unmistakable emphasis of [Gregg] is that the sentencing
authority must view each defendant as an individual to

conform to eighth amendment standards."'"

Three of the

death penalty statutes' were held to be constitutional because

they provided guided discretion in sentencing by mandating
that a jury weigh both the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of each case. The age of the defendant gained
brief attention in this case as an example of a factor the
sentencing body should consider in evaluating the unique
characteristics of the defendant. '
In 1978, the Court in Lockett v. Ohio24 enunciated
unequivocally the requirement that the sentencing authority
must consider all mitigating factors unique to any defendant
before capital punishment may be imposed. Lockett involved
an Ohio statute which allowed a jury to consider only three
mitigating factors.' This limitation precluded the jury from
19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). This case was decided
along with several other cases. See infra note 22.
20. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
21. Homan, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role inthe Development of a Mitigation
Defense, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 767, 784 (1987).
22. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974), TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art.
37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976) (construed in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)); Fla.
Stat. Ann. §§ 782.04, 775.082, 921.141 (West Supp. 1976-77) (construed in Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976)); and Georgia (construed in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
23. "Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital
punishment (e.g., his youth ...)?" GreM, 428 U.S. at 196-98 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).

Also, the Texas statute provided that the sentencing body "could further look to the age of
the defendant." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 273.
24. Lockett v. Ohio, 4-38 U.S. 586 (1978).

25. The three mitigating factors were: 1) Did the victim of the offense induce or facilitate
the offense? 2) Would the offense not have taken place but for the fact that the offender was

under duress, coercion, or strong provocation? and 3) Was the offense primarily the product
of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency? See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)
(Anderson 1975).
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considering such personal aspects as the defendant's character,
prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death and
relatively minor role in the offense.'
As the death sentence was carefully being molded into
its new image, the age of the offender remained but one
factor within the dearth of mitigating circumstances sentencing
bodies had to consider.27 The issue of the constitutionality of
juvenile death sentences remained hidden in the background
awaiting its day to become a forefront issue of its own merit.
Then in 1982, the Court agreed to hear the specific issue of
the constitutionality of capital punishment for an offender who
was only sixteen years old when it granted certiorariin Eddings
v. Oklahoma.'
Eddings was charged with the killing of a highway
patrolman.' Upon being certified to stand trial as an adult,'
and based upon his plea of nolo contendre, Eddings was found
guilty of murder in the first degree.3 After a hearing on the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case, the trial
judge sentenced Eddings to death. The Oklahoma court of
appeals affirmed the conviction32 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.33 While the Court initially
intended to decide the constitutionality issue of capital
punishment imposed on juveniles, the end result found no
resolution in this regard. Rather, in a 5-4 decision, the Court
26. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments, a sentencer must consider any mitigating circumstances defendant presents).
28. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
29. Id. at 105-06. The presentation of facts in death penalty cases is noteworthy.
Opponents of the death penalty try to play down the facts and concentrate more on the legal
arguments. Proponents of the death penalty elucidate each fact in detail. Compare the
plurality opinion with the dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 479 U.S. 1084 (1988),
vacated, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
30. Because of its significance in the juvenile death penalty context, the certification
process, which enables a juvenile to be tried as an adult, is discussed more fully in a later
section. See infra tcx accompanying notes 127-53.
31. In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978), cert denied, 436 U.S. 921 (1978).
32. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
33. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
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bypassed the issue by vacating the death sentence on the
ground that the trial judge had failed to consider all of the
mitigating factors proffered by Eddings.Y While Eddings' age
was considered by the trial judge as a major factor in
mitigation of the death sentence, the judge considered none
of the other evidence offered by Eddings such as his disturbed
background35 or sociopathic and antisocial personality.'
In
fact, the trial judge stated that such additional evidence was
irrelevant to his decision? This ruling, the Court held, violated
Lockett - although the sentencing body has the power to
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence,
it does not have the power to give no weight to such
important evidence.'
Eddings' case was remanded" over the dissent of Chief
Justice Burger, who was joined by Justices Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and White. The Chief Justice argued that Lockett
did not preclude a sentencing body from according relatively
little weight to any mitigating evidence when such evidence is
properly balanced against the circumstances of the crime and
the potential for future dangerous behavior of the offender.'
Since Eddings, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined to resolve the constitutionality issue of juvenile capital
34. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1981) (emphasis added).
35. For example, Eddings was repeatedly beaten by his father and stepfather, and had an
alcoholic mother. See Brief for Petitioner at 66, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1981)
(No. 80-5727) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
36. See infra note 174.
37. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 109.
38. Id. at 114-15.
39. Upon remand, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided it could not weigh
evidence in regard to sentencing and further remanded the case to the district court. Id. at
117. After a rehearing in which the trial judge heard additional evidence proffered by the
defendant, the death sentence was reinstated upon Eddings. Appealing this decision, the
Court of Criminal Appeals realized it had made an error in remanding the.case to the district
court for resentencing, and in an opinion consistent with the Supreme Court's holding,
modified Eddings' sentence to life imprisonment. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 688 P.2d 342 (Old.
Crim. App. 1984).
40. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 126 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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punishment.4" As a result, juvenile offenders were condemned
to death row and states were allowed to continue making their
own death penalty rules as long as age was considered a
mitigating factor by the sentencing body.42
Each stamp of refusal by the Court to grant certiorari
sounded a death knell for juvenile offenders on death row.'
Within the past three years, death sentences were carried out
upon three men who committed murders while juveniles."
Two of these cases went to the Supreme Court where
petitions for certiorari were denied over the consistent
dissenting voices of Justices Marshall and Brennan." In the
third case, the defendant opted to forego any further appeals
41. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930 (11th Cir. 1985), cat denied, 107 S. Ct. 3114
(1987); Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. 1985), cerr denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985), stay
denie4 cert denied, 474 U.S. 1039 (1986); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 478 A.2d 1143
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985); Cannaday v: State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1221 (1985); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693, 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984); Tokman v. State, 435 So. 2d 664 (Miss. 1983), cert denied, 467
U.S. 1256 (1984).
42. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273 (1976).
43. As of August, 1987, there were thirty-eight juvenile offenders on death row. See Brief
of Amici Curiae for Respondent Oklahoma, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)
(No. 86-6169) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
44. Charles Rumbaugh on Sept. 11, 1985 (See N. Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at A19, col.
1) Charles Rumbaugh was the first person in more than two decades to be executed for a
crime committed under the age of 18. Rambaugh's case, which was presented to two separate
juries, involved the 1975 holdup/murder of a Texas jeweler. Both juries found the death
penalty appropriate in light of Rumbaugh's age. Id James Terry Roach on January 10, 1986
(See N. Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at A6, col. 1). Terry Roach was the first person
involuntarily executed for a crime committed while a juvenile. Roach was 17 when he pleaded
guilty to the 1977 murder of two Columbia, S.C. teenagers. In the face of appeals for
clemency by Mother Teresa, Jimmy Carter, the U.N., and O.A.S., the Supreme Court refused
to grant a stay. Id Jay Kelly Pinkerton on May 15, 1986 (See N. Y. Times, May 15, 1986, at
B18, col. 3). Jay Kelly Pinkerton, convicted of stabbing two women to death while a juvenile,
was executed after numerous appeals.
45. See Pinkerton v. McCotter, 476 U.S. 1109, 1110 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I
believe it is time for this Cou.rt to address this issue [whether imposition of the death penalty
is so antagonistic to civilized notions of morality] of profound significance."); Roach v. Aiken,
474 U.S. 1039 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Although '[cjrimes committed by youths may
be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, . . . they [the youthful
criminals] deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their
conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults."') (quoting from Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime
7 (1978)).
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to the Court.'

1I.

THE Thompson v. Okdahoma17 DEMON

Finally, in 1987, the Court decided it would hear the
issue it had originally planned to resolve in Eddings.4 With
its controversial issue at stake, ' Thompson attracted
widespread attention. Seven amicus briefs were filed on
behalf of the defendant."
All briefs for the defendant
espoused the same message to the Court: a bright-line should
be drawn at age eighteen for imposition of the death penalty."'
However, the Court's holding fell short of this mark.
Thompson, a fifteen year old youth, was charged with
the murder of his brother-in-law.52

Finding no reasonable

prospects for rehabilitation in the juvenile court system," the
trial court certified the fifteen year old Thompson to stand
trial as an adult. 4 Thompson was convicted of first degree
murder." At the penalty phase, the jury found the murder to
46. Charles Rumbaugh, supra note 44.
47. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
48. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1981).
49. Thompson actually involved two issues--whether a sentence of death is cruel and
unusual punishment for a crime committed by a fifteen year-old child and whether
photographic evidence that a state court deemed erroneously admitted but harmless at the
guilt phase nonetheless violates a capital defender's constitutional rights by being considered
at the penalty phase. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691. This paper addresses the former issue.
50. Amicus briefs on behalf of Thompson were filed by the Office of the State Appellate
Defender of Illinois, Amnesty International, the American Bar Association, the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association (along with whom the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and the American Jewish Committee joined), the American Society for
Adolescent Psychiatry and the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the International
Hluman Rights Law Group, and the Child Welfare League of America. See Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
51. Id.
52. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690 (plurality opinion).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 127-53.
54. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690.
55. Id. at 2689.
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be especially heinous and fixed the sentence at death.56 The
court of criminal appeals, citing its earlier decision in Eddings,
affirmed the conviction on the ground that once a minor is
certified to stand trial as an adult, he can also be punished as
an adult."
In a 4-1-3 opinion,58 the Supreme Court held that
sixteen was the dividing line, below which the death penalty
becomes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment.59 The basic disagreement between the
three opinions in Thompson was the extent to which a
consensus could be defined in terms of society's acceptance of
juvenile capital punishment.'
While the dissent and
concurrence would look only to state and federal legislation to
determine the consensus, the plurality applied a more
expansive viewpoint by scrutinizing both objective and
subjective factors. 1 Included within these factors were
legislative enactments and resolutions,6 2 international opinion,'
jury behavior," and the juvenile's reduced culpability.' This
paper is premised on the belief that the plurality was correct
in including both sets of factors in its decision. As such, each
factor will be separately scrutinized to illustrate that the
plurality's finding of a consensus at age sixteen falls short of
the line that should have been drawn to protect all persons
under eighteen years of age from being executed.
56. Id. at 2690. Justice Scalia began his dissenting opinion by stating that a detailed
examination of the brutal factual background of the case helped to shed light on Oklahoma's
decision to prosecute William Wayne Thompson as an adult. Id. at 2712.
57. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
58. Justice Stevens announced the plurality opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun joined. Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Scalia
wrote a dissenting opinion in which White and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice
Kennedy took no part in the decision. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2689.
59. Id. at 2700.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 197-223.
61. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690-2700 (plurality opinion).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 66-88.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 89-101.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 102-11.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 112-89.

188

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IV.

[VoL VII

LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTs AND RFSOLUTIoNs

In prior cases, the Court has held that objective factors
are good indicia of how contemporary society views a
particular form of punishment."
One of these objective
factors is legislative enactments.'
Thus, the Thompson
plurality reviewed the statutes of each state to see whether or
not capital punishment is allowed.' The plurality also noted
any age limitations prescribed by these statutes.'
At the time of the Thompson decision, fourteen states
had no death penalty statutes," nineteen states had death
penalty statutes but with no minimum age stated,7' and
66. See, e.g, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277-79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-93 (1982).
67. See, e.g, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976); See also Coker v.

Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion).
68. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2694 (1988).

69. Jd at 2694-95.
70. Alaska (H.B. 99, ch. 132 (1957)); District of Columbia (United States v. Lee, 489 F.2d
1242, 1246-47 (D.C. Cir. 1973), death penalty unconstitutional in light of Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972)); Hawaii (H.B. 706, Act 282 (1957)); Iowa (H.F. 8, ch. 435 (1965));
Kansas (death penalty still on books, KAN. STAT. ANN. Art. 40, §§ 22-4001 to 22-4014 (1981),
but death sentence not included in sentences for first-degree murder which is a Class A
felony. KAN. STAT. ANN. Art 45, § 21-4501(a) (1981)); Maine (Public Laws, ch. 133 (1887));
Massachusetts (death penalty still on books, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 57-71 (Supp. 1987),
but declared unconstitutional. See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 470 N.E.2d
116 (1984)); Michigan (MICH. CONsr., art. 4, § 46 (1985)); Minnesota (H.F. No. 2, ch. 387
(1911)); New York (death penalty still on books, N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 60.06 (Consol.
1987), but declared unconstitutional. See People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479
N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984)); North Dakota (1985 N.D. LAws ch. 115, § 41); Rhode Island (State
v. Cline, 121 R.I. 299, 397 A.2d 1309 (1979), mandatory death penalty unconstitutional after
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 61-11-2
(1984); Wisconsin (General Acts, ch. 103 (1853)).
71. Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39-59, 13A-6-2 (1982 & Supp. 1989)); Arizona (ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703 to 13-706,13-1105 (1989)); Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. 9§ 5-4104(b), 5-4-601-617, 5-10-101, 5-51-201 (1987 & Supp. 1989)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 636, 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1988)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082, 782.04(1),
921.141 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE 99 18-4001-4004, 19-2515 (1987 &
Supp. 1989)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30, 14:113 (1986 & 1990)); Mississippi
(MISS. CODE ANN. 99 97-3-21, 97-7-67, 99-19-101-107 (1973 & Supp. 1989)); Missouri (Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 565.020, 565.030-.040 (1979 & Supp. 1990)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§
45-5-102, 46-18-301 to 46-18-310 (1989)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.10 to 701.15
(1983 & Supp. 1990)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1102(a), tit. 42, § 9711 (1983
& Supp. 1989)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20 (1985 & Supp. 1989));
South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. 99 22-16-4, 22-16-12, 23A-27A-1 to 23A-27A-41
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eighteen states had death penalty statutes with minimum ages
expressed.' To make for a more convincing argument, the
plurality purposely skewed its proportional analysis. First, it
ignored those states which had no death penalty statute.'
Second, it refused to look at the nineteen states which had
death penalty statutes with no minimum age limitations on the
premise that current standards of decency would not tolerate
the execution of little children, something these statutes
seemingly allow.74 Therefore, when confined to the eighteen
states that allowed the death penalty with minimum age
limitations, the plurality noted that every one of these states
required the defendant to have "attained at least the age of
sixteen.""5
The plurality's analysis of these statistics can be
attacked on two different grounds. First, in restricting its
analysis to the minimum age limitations of eighteen states, the
(1988 & Supp. 1989)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. f§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207 (1978 & Supp. 1989));
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §92303, 2403, 7101 to 7107 (1974 & Supp. 1989)); Virginia
(VA. CODE ANN. 9§ 18.2-31, 19.2-264.2 to 19.2-264.5 (1988 & Supp. 1989)); Washington
(WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.010-.900 (1980 & Supp. 1989)); and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. 99
6-2-101-103 (1988).
72. California (CAL PENAL CODE § 190.5 (1988 & Supp. 1990)) (age 18); Colorado
(CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(1)(a) (1986 & Supp. 1989)) (age 18); Connecticut (CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1989)) (age 18); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-9-3 (1982 & Supp. 1989)) (age 17); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b) (SmithHurd 1987 & Supp 1989)) (age 18); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1989)) (age 16); Kentucky ( KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040(1) (Baldwin 1987 & Supp.
1988)) (age 16); Maryland (MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(f) (1987 & Supp. 1989)) (age 18);
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT § 28-105.01 (1989)) (age 18); Nevada (1987 NEV. REV. STAT.
176.025)) (age 16); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(XIII) (Prohibiting the
execution of one who was a minor at the time of the crime), § 21:44 (Defining age 18 as the
age of majority) (1986 & Supp. 1989)) (age 18); New Jersey (NJ. REV. STAT. §§ 2AA4A22(a)(b) (Defining age 18 as the age of majority), 2C:11-3(g) (Prohibits a sentencer from
imposing the death penalty on an individual under the age of majority) (1982 & Supp. 1989))
(age 18); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. 99 28-6-1(A), 31-18-14(A) (1987 & Supp. 1989))
(age 18); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17*(1986 & Supp. 1989)) (age 17); Ohio
(OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1989)) (age 18); Oregon (OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 161.620, 419.476(1) (1989)) (age 18); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1102(3), 37-1-102(4), 37-1-103, 37-1-134(a)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1989)) (age 18); and Texas (TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d) (Vernon 1974 & Supp 1990)) (age 17).
73. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2695.
74. Id
75. Id (emphasis added)
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plurality ignored the already existing consensus against
imposing death sentences on offenders under the age of
eighteen.76 Indeed, twelve of the eighteen states have set
death penalty limits at age eighteen.' In fact, only two states
require the defendant to be sixteen and one of these states
had set its minimum age for capital punishment at age ten
until 1987.' Based on these states, it is clear that there is a
consensus minimum age of eighteen for imposing the death
penalty.'
The second ground upon which the plurality's analysis
can be attacked is that a true proportionality analysis should
have included 51 jurisdictions.' Since other factors8 were
taken into account by the plurality, the purposeful ommission
of 31 states and the District of Columbia was unnecessary.8
Of the 51 jurisdictions, 27 would not execute a person under
eighteen years of age.' While this ratio may not create a
clear consensus, it does indicate that a majority of the states
would not execute a person under eighteen years of age. This
majority viewpoint should be the beginning point of eighth
amendment analysis.'
76. See infra text accompanying notes 197-223.

77. See supra note 72.
78. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3 (Burns 1988). See also Streib, Eighth Amendment
and Capital Punishment, 34 Ctv. ST. L. REv. 363, 370 (1987).

79.

Statistical "gerrymandering" is popular in the juvenile death penalty context.

For

instance, the Thompson dissent argued that an accurate analysis should include all 37 states

which have a death penalty statute. See Thompson, 108 S.Ct. at 2716 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also Wilkens v. Missouri, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 2975 n.2 (1989). Also, in Wilkens,
the Thompson plurality, which became the dissent, "adjusted" its proportional analysis to
include the fifteen states which have no death penalty statute, finding that 27 states would not

execute an eighteen year old. See Wilkens, 109 S.Ct. at 2982-83 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The reason behind such divergent analyses is clear: to make a more favorable

argument for either supporting or refuting whether or not there is a consensus. See infra text
accompanying notes 197-231.
80. 51 jurisdictions include the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
81. Legislative enactments and resolutions, international opinion, jury behavior and the
juvenile's reduced culpability. See text accompanying notes 66-189.
82. In fact, the plurality did take into account all 51 jurisdictions in its dissenting opinion
in Wilkens v. Missouri, 109 S. Ct. at 2982-83 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

83. See supra notes 70-72.
dissenting).
84. See Wilkens, 109 S. Ct. at 2983 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
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Other legislatures and professional organizations also
adhere to the setting of a bright line at age eighteen. For
example, the Senate recently passed the Gekas Bill' which
calls for the death penalty of any person who intentionally kills
another during a drug-related felony.s' However, the Bill
expressly excludes the death penalty for the mentally ill and
those who are under eighteen at the time of their crime.'
The American Bar Association also condemns capital
punishment for an offender under the age of eighteen.'
These additional sources exemplify what should be the modern
trend towards saving juveniles from death row.
V. INTERNATIONAL OPINION

Recognizing the relevance of the views of other nations
in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the
plurality in Thompson, unlike the concurrence or the dissent,'
was willing to examine the international community in helping
it to find a consensus.' Even here, the plurality was willing
to compromise its position. Rather than recognizing the true
consensus among the leading nations that persons under
eighteen should not be executed, the plurality settled for the
position that the consensus among the international community
was that juveniles (without mentioning any age) should not be
executed." This assessment of the international community is
85. Codified now as part of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act. 21 U.S.C.S. § 848
(I) (West 1989).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Editorial, 74 A.B.A. J. 66 (1988).
89. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2706-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (mentions
nothing about international opinion), Idat 2716 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (will only look to state
and federal legislatures to determine a national consensus).
90. The plurality noted that in prior eighth amendment cases, the views of the international
community were considered helpful in determining what is "cruel and unusual punishment."
Thompson, 108 S.Ct. at 26% n.31. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (2d Cir. 1958);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 5% n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion).
91. Thompson, 108 S.Ct. at 26%.
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only partially accurate.
Since 1979, more than 11,000 executions were carried
out in over eighty countries, yet only eight involved juveniles
under the age of eighteen.' In 1973, the Secretary General
of the United Nations stated that the "great majority of
member nations report never condemning to death persons
under eighteen years of age."" Also, although the death
penalty is still allowed, a person under age eighteen may not
be executed in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia,
or in the Soviet Union.'
International draft conventions also follow a definite trend
that treats people under eighteen different than adults. The
drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights' has a separate article dealing exclusively with the
rights of children. This article states that a "sentence of death
shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women."'9 Eighty-six nations have ratified this document, and
seven others, including the United States, have signed it.'
During this draft convention, the Country of Tanganyikan, a
third-world nation, stated that the true goal of developing
nations is to improve the lives of children and future
generations.' To Tanganyikan, killing a child under eighteen
only serves to impair this goal." The draft Convention on the
Rights of the Child"° agrees with this contention. Article
19(2)(b) of the convention prohibits capital punishment or life
92.

Amicus Brief of Amnesty International for the Petitioner at 23-24, Thompson v.

Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
93. Id. at 23 (citing the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the

Secretary General on Capital Punishment at 10, U.N. Doe. E/5242 (1973)).
94. Id.
95. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 16) at 53, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
96. Id. at Art. 6(5).
97. Amicus Brief, supra note 92, at screen 25.
98. See Cohen, The Human Rights of Children, 12 CAP. U. L. REv., 369, 379 (1982).

99. Id.
100. U.N. Does E/CN.4/NGO 265 and 276 (1980).
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imprisonment for anyone under eighteen years of age.'
Therefore, setting the age barrier at sixteen falls short of
international consensus.
VI. JuRy BEHAVIOR
Since the focus of the eighth amendment is punishment
that is cruel and unusual, determining how often juries have
imposed a particular sentence is indicative of how society
accepts such punishment."° In this regard, the plurality in
Thompson confined its analysis of jury behavior to two
important statistics. First, in the 20th century, approximately
nineteen people under age sixteen have been sentenced to
death, most often in the earlier part of the century." 3
Secondly, during the years 1982 through 1986, 82,094 people
were arrested for willful homicide, 1,393 received death
sentences, and of those only five, including Thompson, were
under sixteen at the time of the crime."l These statistics
indicated to the plurality that the sentences received by those
offenders under the age of sixteen were cruel and unusual in
the same manner that "being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual."'"
This rudimentary analysis misses more important points.
For instance, executions of persons under eighteen have fallen
significantly from 53 of 1,288 (4.1%) in the 1940's to 6 of 255
(2.4%) between 1960 and 1986.'" Although it is possible to
say that the execution of children is in vogue because three
101. Id. at Art. 19(2)(b).
102. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2692 n.7 (1988). The concurrence and
dissent in Thompson also agreed that jury behavior is a factor to assess in deciding whether
a punishment is cruel and unusual. However, neither opinion could decipher any consensus
from the statistics relied upon by the plurality. Id. at 2708 (O'Connor, J., concurring), Id
at 2716-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2697.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
106. See Streib, supra note 78, at 380.
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such executions have taken place within the past three years,107
these statistics must be viewed in their proper perspective.
Data compiled by Professor Victor L. Streib, an authority on
juvenile capital punishment, show that the southern United
States accounts for the majority of persons under age eighteen
who are on death row." As of July 1986, 25 of the 32
juveniles (92%) on death row were sentenced in southern
states.Y9 Therefore, only 8% of these juveniles on death row
were put there by juries outside the south. In addition, the
last three executions were performed by Texas and South
Carolina. °
One commentator, who sees no constitutional
implication in sentencing juveniles to death, writes that if a
statistical study could prove quantitatively that juries prefer not
to give juveniles death sentences, it would be convincing
evidence that the public dislikes sentencing juveniles to
death.' The statistics compiled by Professor Streib seem to
fulfill this need. Removing what seems to be a southern
preference to execute juveniles would virtually eliminate all
such sentences.
VII. THE JuvEmLmE's REDUcED CULABnIrr
It has long been recognized that juveniles and adults do
not share equal responsibility for their crimes."2 That
juveniles possess a reduced culpability in committing crimes is
a basic standard accepted by our legal system."' In fact, the
plurality in Thompson considered such a conclusion "too
107. See supra note 44.
108. Streib, supra note 78, at 386.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 44.
111. Hill, Can the Death Penalty Be Imposed on Juveniles: The Unanswered Question in
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 20 CRIM. L.BULL 5, 18 (1984).
112. See, e.g, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1431 (1966).
113. See generally Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1981).

1990]

NOTE

obvious to require extended explanation.""' 4

The general

societal belief that juvenile and adult criminals be. treated
differently should apply with equal force to the death penalty.
Three areas which support this proposition are the state's duty
as parens patriae to protect minors, 1' the arbitrary nature of
the waiver system from juvenile court into adult court,"' and
"time of life" aspects of adolescence which makes juveniles
more susceptible than adults to committing crimes (including
murder), yet less culpable than adults in terms of
punishment.'17
A. State as Parens Patriae
8 in
The power of the state to act as parens patriael"
protecting its minors has long been recognized by the Supreme
Court."9 In Bellotti v. Baird,'" a case involving a minor's right
to have an abortion without the need for parental or judicial

consent, the Court noted that:
[s]tates

.

.

. may limit the freedom of children

to choose for themselves in the making of
114. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. at 2698-99 (1988) (plurality opinion).
115. See infra text accompanying notes 118-26.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 127-53.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 154-89.
118. Literally "parent of the country" "refers traditionally to the role of state as sovereign
and guardian of persons under legal disability. . . . It is a concept of standing utilized to
protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people,
interstate water rights, general economy of the state." BLACKS LAw DICIONARY 1003 (5th
ed. f979) (citations omitted).
119. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Burger, Ci., concurring) ("[The
states are vested with the historic parenspatriaepower, including the duty to protect 'persons
under legal disabilities to act for themselves.'" Id. at 583) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)). Although Donaldson involved a mentally retarded person,
minors are also considered persons possessed with legal disabilities in terms of the state's
power to protect such persons. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (right of
pregnant minor to seek an abortion was found to be unconstitutionally burdened by statute
requiring minor to obtain consent from parents or to obtain judicial approval following
notification to parents)).
120. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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important, affirmative choices with potentially
serious consequences . . . during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them."2'
State and federal legislatures also recognize the inherent
difficulty of minors to make responsible decisions. For
instance, people under eighteen are not allowed to vote,12
serve as jurors,123 or join the armed forces."' The premise
behind such deprivations (which, if applied to adults, would
necessarily have constitutional implications) is that minors are
not possessed with the full capacity to make individual
choices."2 Therefore, it is difficult to understand how states
121. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
122. U.S. CON T. amend. XXVI, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any state on the account of age." Id.
123. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 510 (Consol. 1988). § 510 Qualifications provide:
In order to qualify as a juror a person must:
1. Be a citizen of the United States, and a resident of the county.
2. Be less than seventy-six and not less than eighteen years of age.
3. Be in possession of his natural faculties and not incapable, by reason
of mental or physical infirmity, of rendering satisfactory jury service.
4. Not have been convicted of a felony.
5. Be intelligent of good character, able to read and write the English
language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily
the juror qualification questionnaire, and be able to speak the English
language in an understandable manner.
Id (emphasis added).
124. 10 U.S.C § 505 (a) (1988) provides:
(a) The Secretary concerned may accept original enlistments in the Regular Army,
Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, Regular Marine Corps, or Regular Coast Guard,
as the case may be, of qualified, effective, and able-bodied persons who are not less
than seventeen years of age. However, no person under eighteen years of age may
be originally enlisted without the written consent of his parent or guardian, if he has
a parent or guardian entitled to his custody and control
Id (emphasis added).
125. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J.,concurring). In
Bellotti, the Court recognized three specific reasons justifying the conclusion that the
constitutional rights of minors cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner, and the importance of the parental role in child rearing. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
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can execute minors. Can a state at one moment say that
minors are incapable of making adult decisions, then at the
next moment say that minors should be held as responsible
as adults for their acts? Such a standard of convenience
should not be tolerated when it involves criminal punishment.
As the Court stated in Eddings:
Crimes committed by youths may be just as
harmful to victims as those committed by older
persons, but they [the crimes] deserve less
punishment because adolescents may have less
capacity to control their conduct and to think in
long-range terms than adults. Moreover, youth
crime as such is not exclusively the offender's
fault; offenses by the young also represent a
failure of family, school, and the social system,
which share the responsibility for the

development of America's youth."2 '
B. The Waiver System
662, 634 (1979).
That minors cannot make fully-informed decisions is also illustrated by the reluctance of
states to emancipate minors. Emancipation allows a minor to usurp his minority status and
assume the rights and responsibilities of adulthood regardless of age. Only fourteen states
have emancipation statutes. See Comment, The Uncertain Status of the EmancipatedMinor:
Why We Need a Uniform Statutory Emancipation of Minors Act (USEMA), 15 U.S.F. L. REV.
473, 477-78 (1981) (noting that most of the emancipation statutes were enacted by the
Southern states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century). In the common law as
well, courts are reluctant to grant a minor emancipated status. See generally Newburgh v.
Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982) ("Although emancipation need not occur at any
particular age, a rebuttable presumption against emancipation exists prior to attaining the
age of majority, now 18." Id. at 535, 443 A.2d at 1037); Abbott v. Abbott, 673 S.W.2d 723
(Ky. Ct. App. 1984) ("As to a child who is not handicapped, . . . emancipation (citation
omitted) ... occurs when such a child becomes 18 years of age." Id. at 725).
126. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.l (1982) (quoting from the 1978 Report
of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Towards Young Offenders).
But see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Minors who become
embroiled with the law range from the very young up to those on the brink of majority.
Some of the older minors become fully 'street-wise,' hardened criminals, deserving no greater
consideration than that properly accorded all personssuspected of crime." Id. at 734 n.4).
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The waiver system from juvenile court into criminal
court allows the juvenile to be sentenced as an adult.'27 It is
another area which supports the proposition that eighteen is
the appropriate line to draw for imposition of the death
penalty.'
In 1899, the first juvenile court was established in Cook
County, Illinois." This new court was created due to the
popular belief that juveniles should not be held equally
accountable as adults for similar crimes.' It was recognized
that youths were less mature, less able to exercise control and
judgment, and more easily influenced by others. 3 ' Because of

their environment, these youngsters seemed less culpable than
adults for their actions.'32 Today, all states have a juvenile
court system.'33 Thirty-eight states set age eighteen as the
maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction." Thus, there is
a rebuttable presumption in most states that a person under
eighteen is not "mature and responsible enough to be
127. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have some form of waiver. Feld, Changes
In Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987). There are three forms
of waiver proceedings: legislative waiver, judicial waiver, and prosecutor waiver. G. Vrro &
D. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 60 (1985). Judicial waiver allows the
juvenile court judge, at his or her discretion, to request that the criminal court handle a
particular matter. Id Legislative waiver is governed by state statutes which guide the transfer
proceedings. Id Finally, prosecutor waiver allows the prosecutor to decide which court juvenile or criminal - he or she wishes to try the minor. The prosecutor's decision is then
reviewed by the respective judge for conformity with the state's juvenile waiver statute. Id
128. Many waiver statutes, rules and guidelines focus on the age of 18 as the dividing line
between childhood and adulthood. See infra text accompanying notes 143-46.
129.

See Kalogerakis, Legal Issues, 5 ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY ANN. REV., 497, 498

(1986).
130. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-31 (1967). The recognition that juvenile
offenders should be treated differently from adult offenders was labelled by one commentator
as 'The Period of Enlightenment" because rehabilitation replaced punishment as the form of
state intervention. Kalogerakis, supra note 129, at 498.
131. Amicus brief of the American Bar Association for the Petitioner at 5, Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86 - 6169) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs file).
132. Id.
133. Amicus Brief of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association for Petitioner at
10, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (No. 86-6169) (1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Briefs file).
134. Id. at 11.
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punished as an adult. 13
The theory behind the waiver system from juvenile
court into adult court is that some juveniles are simply not
amenable to treatment and rehabilitation in the juvenile justice
system."'~ The two types of waiver systems utilized by states
are judicial and legislative. 37 Legislative waiver involves the
use of objective criteria while judicial waiver is based mainly
on the discretion of the judge."3 Forty-five states utilize some
form of judicial waiver. 39
44 the Supreme Court outlined
In Kent v. United States,"
Several criteria courts should use in making the waiver
decision. These criteria include the seriousness of the alleged
offense, the manner in which the offense was committed,
whether the offense was against person or property, the prior
record of the juvenile offender, and the likelihood that the
juvenile could be rehabilitated. 41 In making the waiver
decision, the judge should also scrutinize such subjective
factors as the "chances of protecting the safety of the public"
and the "sophistication and maturity of the juvenile."'4 2
A judicial waiver system is necessarily subjective. This
subjectivity is apparent in the federal system where youthful
offenders are treated under the Federal Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 (CCA) 43

A principle purpose of the

CCA is to rehabilitate persons who are unusually vulnerable
to the danger of recidivism because of their youth."4 The
135.

Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2693 n.22 (quoting DAVIS, RIGHrIs OF JUVENILES:

THE

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, App. B (2d ed. 1987)).

136. See Hill, supra note 111, at 27.
137. Id. at 28.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
141. Id. at 566-68.
142. Hill, supra note 111, at 29.
143. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5032-5041 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
144. See Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 206 (1981); U.S. v. Alexander, 695 F.2d 398,

401 (9th Cir. 1982). At the time of these two cases, the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 5005-5006 (1982) (repealed 1984), was still in force.
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CCA defines a "juvenile" as a "person who has not attained
his eighteenth birthday" and "juvenile delinquency" as a
"violation

.

.

.

committed by a person prior to his

eighteenth birthday which would have been a crime if
committed by an adult.""'4 Thus, the federal government also
recognizes the rebuttable presumption that a person under
eighteen is not "mature and responsible enough to be
punished like an adult."'"1
For a juvenile to be transferred into a district court, the
CCA requires that the juvenile be at least fifteen years of
age 47 and have committed an alleged act that would have
been a felony if done by an adult. The transfer must also be
in the interest of justice.'" To guide this discretion, Congress
has directed the court to consider six factors. These factors
are the juvenile's age and social background, the nature of the
alleged offense, the prior record of the offender, the juvenile's
intellectual development and psychological maturity, the nature
of and response to past treatment, and the availability of
programs designed to treat the juvenile's problems.'49
In the same manner that state court judges must utilize
subjective criteria in weighing the transfer process, federal
court judges also must grapple with the subjective yardstick in
deciding whether the transfer would be in the interest of
justice. Such a standard cannot be applied consistently since
it is inherently subjective in nature."'
The decision to try a
juvenile as an adult is nothing more than a prediction of the
possibility of rehabilitation if the juvenile is found to be guilty
145. 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1982 & Supp. 1988).

146. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2693 n.22 (1988) (plurality opinion).
147. The age limit was lowered from sixteen to fifteen in 1984. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032
(1982 & Supp. 1988).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). In his dissenting opinion
in Thompson, Justice Scalia cited the lowering of the waiver age in the CCA as support for
his contention that Congress believes juveniles at a younger age can be responsible enough
to be tried and sentenced as an adult. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
150. Cf U.S. v. Alexander, 695 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1982) with U.S. v. E.K., 471 F. Supp.
924 (D. Or. 1979).
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of the crime alleged. 5 ' As one commentator notes, "[Judicial
waiver systems] ask the impossible. Accurate assessments of
future criminal involvement are beyond our society's present
technical capabilities and certainly beyond the capabilities of
a single judge."'52 A juvenile, therefore, should not be made
death-eligible simply because a judge has subjectively
determined that juvenile to be "mature."'53 As a proposed
solution to this problem, either the waiver system should be
abandoned, or special circumstances should be implemented
in those states which have the death penalty to remove those
juveniles transferred into adult court from being sentenced to
death.
C. "Time of Life" Aspects of Adolescence

"Time of life" aspects of adolescence are perhaps the
most telling evidence in understanding the reduced culpability
inherent in this period of life. These aspects of life include
both the psychological and emotional makeup of the
adolescent. The significance of this intangible evidence was
discussed by the Thompson plurality. The plurality explicitly
embraced the notion that youth is much more than "just a
chronological fact."'54 This belief, however, was not shared by
the other members of the Court.'
151. Alexander, 695 F.2d at 401.
152. Hill, supra note 111, at 29.
153. As another commentator notes, the time period from 1975 to the present has been
marked by public disillusionment with the juvenile court system due to the increase in violent
juvehile crime. As a result of this negative reaction, there was a shift in emphasis from
separate treatment of juveniles to the protection of society. Among the demands to curb
violent youthful offenders has been a call for lower age limits for waiver into adult courts, and
"just deserts" punishment.
This shift to stricter measures has been labelled by this
commentator as the "Period of Retrenchment." Kalogerakis, supra note 129, at 498-504.
154. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2698 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
(quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1981)). See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596, 599 (1948) (recognizing the "period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence
produces."); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
155. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and 2719 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Utilization of this criteria is proper when attempting to
find the consensus with respect to juvenile capital punishment.
Beginning with the Court's historical decision in Marbury v.
Madison,56 the judiciary rule of thumb has been expounded in
Chief Justice Marshall's phrase: "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is."' Recognizing that this duty applies equally to eighth
amendment analysis, the Court emphasized in Enmund v.
5 8 that "[a]lthough the judgment of legislatures, juries
Florida"
and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us [the
judiciary] ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment
permits imposition of the death penalty .,,t9
Understanding the nature of adolescence is important in
making this judgment.
Adolescents are egotists."6 They often view their
opinions as being right and other contradictory opinions as
being wrong."'
This special feeling leads to a belief in
immortality and allows the adolescent to dehumanize others
into abstract objects rather than human beings. 62 Adolescence
is characterized by emotion rather than rationality."6 These
youngsters often live for the moment with little thought of
future consequences for their present actions." They typically
156. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
157. Id. at 177.
158. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
159. Id. at 797. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion).
160. Amicus Brief for the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry and the American
Orthopsychiatric Association for the Petitioner at 6, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687
(1988) (No. 86-6169).
161. Id. This may also help to explain why many juvenile criminals believe that they are

too young to be punished severely by the law.
162. Homan, supra note 21, at 790. See also Miller & Looney, The Prediction of
Adolescent Homicide: Episodic Dyscontrol and Dehumanization, 34 Am.J. PSYCHOANALYSIS
187, 189 (1974).

163. Amicus Brief for the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note 160.
164.

Id. at 5. Many of the adolescent's behaviors are ego-syntronic in that they are

responsive to environmental pressures such as peer groups.

See Id. at 7. In a study

performed on violent youths, researchers found that many forms of violence, including
homicide, were done by members of a gang which sanctioned such behavior, and that such

murderous activity espoused by the group may not have the same connotation as murderous
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have not yet learned to accept the finality of death.'"
Together, a feeling of omnipotence and an inability to fear
death contributes to the adolescent performing potentially
destructive acts like attempting suicide,1" taking dangerous
drugs, racing cars, and other hazardous behaviors. 67
Adolescents who murder usually suffer additional
handicaps. Studies of homicidal minors reveal that these
juveniles are frequently subjected to intense emotional
deprivation and physical violence in their homes.'" In many
instances, the child suffers severe and repeated physical
abuse.'" Frequent brutal fights between the child's parents
are commonplace.
In addition, substance abuse by one or
both parents often figures prominently in the childhood of the
juvenile murderer. 7 ' Also, such adolescents tend to be

intellectually immature and educationally deficient," and are
more apt to exhibit signs of paranoia and illogical thoughts
than nonviolent youths."7 Juvenile murderers may also be
suffering from some sort of chronological impairment which
activity undertaken alone or with a passive partner.
See Yates, Beutler & Crago,
Characteristics of Young Violent Offenders, 11 J. PSYCHOLOGY & L. 137, 147 (1983)
[hereinafter Yates]. But see State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 215, 255 S.E.2d 799, 823 (1979),
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1027 (1980) (peer pressure considered a mitigating factor).
165. Amicus Brief for the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note 160.
166. Adolescents often view suicide as a form of running away without any consideration
that death will occur. Id.
167. Id. at 5.
168. Homan, supra note 21, at 769-70.
169. Child abuse is continually cited as a leading cause of multiple personality disorders
in adolescents. See Elliot, State Inten'ention and Childhood Multiple Personality Disorder, 11
J. PSYCHOLOGY & L. 441 (1982). Such disorders are characterized by the presence of one
of more actor personalities each of which possess different sets of values and behaviors from
the other. Id. It is possible then that one of the personalities may possess murderous
instincts and be responsible for the youth's actions at the time of the killing. Id. This in turn
would mean that any youth found to have a multiple personality disorder should not be held
fully responsible for the murder committed so as to be sentenced to death. Id. The problem
is that this disease is not well known among lawyers, judges, or even mental health
professionals and may go undiagnosed in the condemned youth. Id.
170. Amicus Brief for the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note 160.
171.

Homan, supra note 21, at 770.

172. Id.
173. See Yates, supra note 164, at 141.
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often times may be impossible to diagnose until the juvenile
has aged. 74

A clinical study was performed on juvenile murderers
who live on death row. 75 The juveniles used in the study were
chosen exclusively because of their age at the time they
committed murder. 76

The study found many similarities between these young
offenders." 7 Background histories included difficulties at birth,
head injuries," illnesses, drug overdoses known to affect the
central nervous system, loss of consciousness, fainting,
blackouts or other lapses, and seizures and symptoms
suggestive of psychomotor epilepsy." 9 All fourteen juveniles
exhibited psychiatric disturbances of some sort."s Twelve of
the fourteen subjects also had I.Q. scores below ninety.t"' The
174. One of the more common impairments in this category is antisocial personality

disorder. The Psychiatric Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM 111)indicates that this
disorder begins to develop prior to age fifteen but cannot be diagnosed until the youth has at
least reached the age of eighteen. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISnCAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 319 (3d ed. 1980) (emphasis added). A study
done on convicted felons notes that most criminals are sociopaths, and that while there is no
concrete evidence to indicate that sociopathy is a treatable disorder with currently available
treatment methods, sociopathic behavior does begin to show improvement in the later part
of the fourth decade of the person's life. Garvey, The Criminal:A Psychiatric Viewpoint, 8 J.
PSYCHOLOGY & L. 457, 457-64 (1980). Together, the DSM III and the study are persuasive
indicia negating the idea of executing juvenile murderers.
Also, during the appeal process of James Terry Roach's death sentence, it was discovered
that Mr. Roach was suffering from Huntington's disease, a fatal genetic disorder that
progressively hampers mental and physical capabilities. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at 6,
col. 1. Mr. Roach's lawyers argued unsuccessfully that this disease could not have been
diagnosed in 1977 when the murders occurred, and that the sentence of death should be
reduced. Id.
175. D. Lewis, J. Pincus, B. Bard, E. Richardson, M. Feldman, L. Prichep & C. Yeager,
Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned
to Death in the United States (October 1987) (unpublished paper referenced in the Amicus
Brief for the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note 160.

176. Id. at 3A.
177. Id.
178. The victims of the head injuries were also found to have localized brain damage,
grand mal seizures and abnormal head circumference. Id. at 6A.
179. Id.
180. Either psychosis, severe mood disorders, or periodic paranoia. Id.

181. An I.Q. score of 100 is considered average. A person with an I.Q. score of 90 falls
into the bottom 25% of other individuals of the same age. Id. at 7A.

1990]

NOTE

study concluded that: the multiple battering suffered by these
youths sometimes caused actual brain damage which resulted
in increased impulsiveness; the severe parental violence
functioned as a model for the youth's abnormal behavior;"
and the extreme brutality to which the youth was exposed
promoted rage which was displaced onto other individuals in
their environment. 83 These conclusions are persuasive
evidence that such juveniles should not be held fully
responsible for their acts.
Adolescence is "the period of physical and psychological
development from the onset of puberty to maturity.""t It is
the transitional period between childhood and adulthood."
This stage of life lasts roughly from age twelve to age
nineteen." While it can be argued that all murderers, adult
and juvenile, suffer the same emotional turmoil, the primary
difference is that juveniles have not had the time to mature
or been given the chance to change.'" There is a presumption
still existing for persons within the stage of adolescence that
they have not developed the judgment, fully-formed identity,
or character of adults."
If punishment is to be "directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant,"'8
this correlation does not justify the imposition of a death
sentence on juveniles.
182. Early paternal influence seems stronger than the maternal influence in determining
the presence or absence of violent activity. Many authors have found that positive
identification with the father acts as a deterrent to delinquency and that a lack of paternal
contact is a powerful predictor of antisocial behavior. Yates, supra note 164, at 141.
183. See supra note 165.
184. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 17 (lst ed. 1976).
185. Brunstetter & Silver, Normal Adolescent Development, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 1608 (4th ed. 1985).
186. GORDON, The Tattered Cloak of Immortality, in ADOLESCENCE AND DEATH 12, 17-19

(1986).
187. Statistics show that people have a lesser propensity to commit crimes as they mature
into adulthood. See Zimring, Ameican Youth Violence: Issues and Trends, in CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REViEW OF RESEARCH 67, 67 (1979).
188. See Amicus Brief for the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note 160.

189. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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D. Penal Justificationsof the Death Penalty
The reduced culpability of the juvenile also negates the
two penal justifications for having the death penalty--general
deterrence and retribution."t As the Court previously held,
the death penalty has little deterrent effect against defendants
who have a reduced capacity for considered choice 9 ' since
such persons are unlikely to precede their murderous acts with
"cold calculus" of thought."9 And even where it can be said
that juveniles do calculate, the fear of death will not be a
deterrent since such young offenders have not yet learned to
accept the finality of death."
Retribution, which the Court defines as "the expression
of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct,"'"
is also an unsatisfactory justification for the juvenile death
penalty. Retribution goes to the degree of culpability of the
offense and not the extent of the unjury on the victim. By
sentencing youths to death, society is inflicting an irreversible
form of punishment on a class of persons whose degree of
responsibility mandates less severe measures."
As Justice

Stewart wrote in dissent in In Re Gault, "[the effort to treat
the criminal behavior of minors differently than adults is] the
190. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976) (plurality opinion).
191. See generally Skipper v. South Carolina, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1675 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
192. Gregg 428 U.S. at 186. Unlike, for instance, "contract" killers or terrorists.
193. See supra text accompanying note 165. Proponents of the death penalty often argue
that to deter severe behavior, the punishment must be just as severe. As the noted English
jurist Sir James Fitzjames Stephen stated, "No other punishment deters men so effectively
from committing crimes as the punishment of death." Schoenfeld, The Desire to Abolish
Capital Punishment: A Psychoanalytically Oriented Analysis, J. PSYCHIATRY & L., Summer
1983, at 157 (emphasis added) (quoted in Roche, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Death Penalty,
38 PRISON J. 46, 47 (1958)). The distinction between men (meaning persons of adult status,
or over the age of 18, the general legal age of majority and responsibility) and children is
important. See generally United States v. EK., 471 F. Supp. 924 (D. Ok. 1979). This
argument, therefore, loses its vitality when a juvenile offender is involved.
194. Gregg 428 U.S. at 183.
195. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) ("American criminal law has long
considered a defendant's intention--and therefore his moral guilt--to be critical to-the degree
of [his]
culpability.").
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enlightened task of bringing us out of the world of Charles
Dickens in meeting our responsibilities to the child in our
society."'" The lex talionis approach to youthful killers serves
no legitimate form of retribution.

VIII. DEFmRm A CONSENSUS
Through all its dicta, the primary dispute in Thompson
was reduced to a single question: what defines a consensus in
terms of eighth amendment analysis? The importance of this
question cannot be overstated--it formed the basis of each
opinion as to the ultimate meaning of "cruel and unusual
punishment." The plurality, concurrence, and dissent each
formulated various interpretations of a consensus, utilizing
different criteria to arrive at divergent meanings.
The necessity of finding a consensus in eighth
amendment jurisprudence is clear. Whether a punishment is
"unusual" is directly tied into the frequency of its occurrence
or the magnitude of its acceptance.9"
This, in turn,
demonstrates the "evolving standards of decency""' of a
present-day society and what is considered "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.""t No Justice on the Court would
seem to disagree with this rationale.
Yet, there is
disagreement on what constitutes a consensus.
A consensus is defined as a "general agreement" or
"collective opinion."'
For Eighth Amendment analysis, the
196.
197.
198.
199.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1%7) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2692 n.7 (1988) (plurality opinion).
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (2d Cir. 1958).
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See also Weems v. U.S., 217

U.S. 349 (1910) ("The [cruel and unusual punishment clause] .

.

. is not fastened to the

obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice." Id. at 374).
200. See generally NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, SECOND EDmON 302 (1974); THE AMERICAN
283 (1976). A "consensus of opinion," or
"consensus opinion," though often used expressions, are redundant and should be replaced
by the phrase, "collective opinion." See generally THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, NEW
HERITAGE DICIONARY, NEW COLLEGE EDmON

COLLEGE EDmON 283 (1976).
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Court in the past has included within this general definition
"history and precedents, legislative attitudes, and the response
of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions ....."'

The

Thompson plurality utilized the full selection of criteria in
arriving at its decision that executing persons under sixteen is
cruel and unusual punishment.'
While the plurality's definition of a consensus is the
only one which attempted to expound the "collective opinion"
in terms of objective and subjective factors, its analysis could
have been expanded to include all persons under age
eighteen.' Its unwillingness to go this extra step representes
a compromise to this definition. In light of this compromising
position, the plurality's definition of a consensus more
appropriately seems to be "the minimum threshold as
established by the collective opinion."
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, agreed with the
plurality that there "likely does exist" a national consensus
against executing persons under sixteen.' However, Justice
O'Connor would have agreed with the dissent that there was
no such consensus had the nineteen states that have a death
penalty but no minimum age limitation expressly stated that
their death penalty statutes applied to persons under 16.'
O'Connor was concerned that these 19 states might not have
201.

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).

202. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2691-92 (1988) (plurality opinion). While
the plurality did not use the word "consensus" in its opinion, its analysis of the various
objective and subjective factors was nonetheless an attempt to espouse the collective opinion.

Id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. Indeed, in Stanford v. Kentucky/Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), the
Thompson plurality explicitly stated in its dissenting opinion that these factors apply to all
persons under eighteen years of age. Id. at 2982.
204. Thompson, 108 S.Ct. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 2707-08. This was also the ground upon which she concurred in Thompson.
Id. at 2711
In this unique situation, I am prepared to conclude that petitioner and
others who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may not
be executed under the authority of a capital punishment statute that
specifies no minimum age at which the commission of a capital crime can
lead to the defender's execution.
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fully considered the fact that juveniles waived into the adult
court might become death-eligible. ' Even so, O'Connor saw
these 19 states and the federal government's CCA 7 as
obstacles in support of finding a consensus.' Also, she could
find no clear support of a consensus in such other factors as
jury behavior or the reduced culpability of the juvenile
offender.' To O'Connor, therefore, a consensus seems to be
"a clear and convincing indication of the collective opinion."
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, phrased the
foundational question of Thompson as follows:
[Is there] a national consensus that no criminal
so much as one day under 16, after individuated
consideration of his circumstances, including the
overcoming of a presumption that he should not
be tried as an adult, can possibly be deemed
mature and responsible enough to be punished
with death for any crime[?]"'
While the plurality was satisfied to exclude from its analysis
those states which have the death penalty but no minimum
age limitation, and include international opinion. To Justice
Scalia, a consensus on capital punishment had to have a
purely American definition, established solely within the four
corners of the United States.21' This consensus, Justice Scalia
believed, could best"12 be measured through objective criteria
in the form of state and federal legislation. 3
206. Id.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 143-53.
208. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2708.
209. Id. at 2708-09.
210. Id. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 2715, 2716 n.4 ("We must never forget it is the Constitution of the United
States of America we are expounding." Id.).
212. The word "best" is relevant in this context; however, after the decision in Wilkins v.
Missouri, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), the more appropriate word to use would seem to be "only."
See infra text accompanying notes 224-31.
213. Thompson, 108 s. Ct. at 2716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The dissent, of course, was unwilling to concede those
states with a death penalty but no minimum age
requirement.21 When viewed in its entirety, the statistics
indicated that almost 40% of the states (19) as well as the
federal government would allow the execution of a 16 year
old. 15 Even though this meant that over 60% of the states"6
would not execute an offender under sixteen, a consensus was
not readily apparent to the dissent. Therefore, to Justice
Scalia, a consensus seemed to be "something more than the
collective opinion. ' t7

The main thrust of Justice Scalia's dissent was that the
statistics relied upon by the plurality for both legislative
enactments and jury behavior were inconclusive as to whether
they indicated a consensus."' Justice Scalia was afraid that if
the statistics did show a "consensus," the same analysis used by
the plurality could justify the conclusion that all persons under
eighteen should not be executed.1 9 Justice Scalia was willing
to admit that at some age a bright line does exist, but he saw
no objective factors justifying the conclusion that sixteen was
where the line should be drawn.'
The dissent's unwillingness to include subjective factors
in its analysis also implies a rigid application of the term
consensus. Finding this portion of the plurality's opinion as
"irrelevant,' 1 Justice Scalia opined that a consensus as to what
is cruel and unusual punishment must be comprised of
society's beliefs and not those of the members of the Court.'
214. Id. at 2716.
215. Id.
216. Congress has also supported this in proposed legislation. See supra text accompanying
notes 85-88.
217. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716-18. This definition was more clearly defined in Justice
Scalia's opinion for the court in Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989). See infra text
accompanying notes 224-31.
218. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2718.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2719.
222. Id.
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Therefore, a more accurate definition of the word consensus
to Justice Scalia would seem to be "a clear and objective
indication of something more than the collective opinion."'

IX. DEFINING A NEW CONSENSUS:
Wldkens v. Missouri
Wilkens v. Missouri4 tested the resultant age gap
created by the Court's decision in Thompson for juveniles
between sixteen and eighteen years of age. Heath Wilkens
and Kevin Stanford, sixteen and seventeen years of age
respectively, hoped the Court would make capital punishment
unconstitutional for juveniles in their respective age group. By
ruling in favor of both juveniles, the Court would have
protected all persons under eighteen years of age from being
sentenced to death. With the "new" Court' deciding these
cases, however, the appeals of both youths failed.
In the final analysis, the Wilkens decision proved to be
merely restatements of the opinions expressed in Thompson.
The only differences between the two decisions were the
addition of Justice Kennedy to the Thompson dissenting block
in forming the new majority and Justice O'Connor's
concurrance based on her Thompson requirement that each of
the death penalty statutes in question expressed minimum age
limitations. Otherwise, Wilkens was basically the same as
Thompson in substance.
The Wilkens decision did, however, clarify the new
Court's definition of a consensus. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia intimates that a consensus is basically a
223. See infra text accompanying notes 226-31.
224. 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989). This case was decided together with Stanford v. Kentucky.
225. The "new" court means the addition of Justice Kennedy who seems to have further
solidified an already conservative majority vote.
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That is, the majority truly must see

a "united states" before it will perceive a consensus.
precedents as established by Coker v. Geogia,

7

Citing
Ford v.

Wainwright,' and Solem v. Helm,' Justice Scalia espouses
phrases such as "sole jurisdiction," "no state in the union," and
"in any other state" to buttress his belief that a consensus can
be found only in the absolute.' This definition of a consensus
is clearly beyond the literal context of the word and its use in
eighth amendment analysis."
Unfortunately, it may be a
definition that we will have to live with, and juveniles between
the ages of sixteen and eighteen will die with, for many more
years.
X.

CONCLUSION

Murder is appalling whether it is committed by a
juvenile or an adult. No one will argue that assumption.
However, it must be remembered that punishment is
determined by the degree of culpability of the offender. The
fact that juveniles are less responsible than adults for their
crimes makes the imposition of the death penalty on this class
of persons unjust. Life imprisonment with the possibility of
eventual parole is an acceptable standard in a modern society
where rehabilitation, rather than destruction, should be the
penal goal. Our society has progressed far enough to
acknowledge that the "killing-back" of youths is wrong.
226. The New World Dictionary defines "unaminous" as "agreeing completely," and "united
in opinion." See 2 THE NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1543 (1974).

227.
228.
229.
230.

433 U.S. 584 (1977).
106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986).
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Justice Scalia also cites Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), where the Court

recognized that only eight jurisdictions allowed the death penalty to be imposed in situations
where the defendant participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was
committed. This citation presents an interesting question: Would Justice Scalia be satisfied
with this lesser percentage if faced with the issue today? Until such a situation arises,
Enmund must be deemed an anomaly, thrown in by Justice Scalia to bolster an argument
based upon percentages much less than those in Enmund.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 197-201.
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Future decisions involving the juvenile death penalty will
again hinge on each Justice's definition of the consensus.
While objective factors play a major role in defining this
consensus, the Court should not be blinded to the subjective
aspects of adolescence. Together, both sets of factors present
persuasive evidence that the death penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment when applied to persons under eighteen
years of age. Society's killer instinct should not be deemed
legal until the offender is held in the same regard.
Glenn M. Bieler

